Introduction
As every student of international law knows, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), like its predecessor, can only hear cases between * Post doctoral researcher at Aarhus University. Guest researcher, International Law and Policy Institute, Oslo, Norway. Notably, the focus of the article is not on the legal personality of human beings vis-à-vis other actors on the international stage. Rather, the aim is to illustrate the limited influence of the overall concept of international legal personality on treaty-making processes with the example of the individual as the ultimate non-state actor. The rationale for choosing the PCIJ Statute as a case study is that it was adopted at a time when the 'states-only' conception of international legal personality was widely accepted. Challenges, including the idea that the individual is the ultimate subject of international law, gradually emerged in the inter-war period.4 But in 1920 it seems to have been common ground among scholars that states alone were international legal persons. Moreover, the PCIJ Statute is a valuable example because it does not belong to a special field of international law, such as international human rights law,5 which may be considered as forming an exception to a general rule.
The article is structured as follows: At the outset, section 2 will provide a brief account for the origin of the notion of international legal personality followed by an explanation for the 'states-only' conception dominating the Procès-verbaux, 1920, pp. 203-217 
